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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Internet is ubiquitous.  Over the past two decades, it has 
grown and evolved, overcome boundaries, and defied containment.  
The Internet can now be accessed not only through a designated 
computer terminal but on any number of devices: wireless laptop 
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computers, cellular telephones, e-readers,1 game consoles,2 
televisions,3 cars,4 and even refrigerators.5  Unfortunately, while the 
Internet has undoubtedly made many aspects of our lives easier, it 
has also provided more opportunities to run afoul of the law, 
infringe intellectual property rights, and engage in tortious speech 
and activities.6 
One of the predominant properties of the Internet is the 
general veil of anonymity.  The Internet, in contrast with the real 
world, lacks many of the self-authenticating features that human 
society has come to rely on when identifying individuals.7  In real 
life it is difficult to disguise one’s identity, and the difficulty 
increases with familiarity because familiarity brings with it 
knowledge about a multitude of variables: one’s appearance, one’s 
tone of voice, one’s physical movements, etc.  But, on the Internet, 
familiarity is usually linked to a small handful of factors—often just 
a username and password combination.8  If you have the correct 
 
 1. See Brad Stone, In Price War, E-Readers Go Below $200, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 
2010, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/22/technology/ 
22reader.html?ref=technology. 
 2. See Sony’s PS3 Price Cut: Desperate, or Savvy Move?, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Aug. 
17, 2011), http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/199254/20110817/sony-ps3-price-cut-
wii-xbox-360.htm. 
 3. See Forrest Hartman, What Is an Internet-Enabled TV?, ABOUT.COM, http: 
//tv.about.com/od/frequentlyaskedquestions/f/InternetTVFAQ.htm (last visited 
Sept. 11, 2011). 
 4. See Brian Cooley, Cadillac Rolls Out in-Car Internet Access, CNET REVIEWS 
(Mar. 19, 2009, 4:00 AM), http://reviews.cnet.com/8301-13746_7-10199833-
48.html. 
 5. See, e.g., LG Internet Refrigerator, LG, http://us.lge.com/www/product 
/refrigerator_demo.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2011).  
 6. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1212–13 
(D. Minn. 2008) (involving an Internet user accused of illegal copyright 
infringement after sharing music files); Scheff v. Bock, No. 03-022837, 2007 WL 
6930518, at ¶ 1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 25, 2007) (involving a lawsuit for defamation over 
written material published on the Internet). 
 7. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 45 (2006) (“The absence of relatively 
self-authenticating facts in cyberspace makes it extremely difficult to regulate 
behavior there.”). 
 8. Although systems are being developed to expand the number of 
authenticating facts—for example, Google has begun to look for suspicious 
account activity, primarily by recording “the geographic region that [it] can best 
associate with the access”—many online services have not yet implemented 
advanced anti-fraud mechanisms.  See Pavni Diwanji, Detecting Suspicious Account 
Activity, GOOGLE ONLINE SECURITY BLOG (Mar. 24, 2010, 9:15 AM), 
http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2010/03/detecting-suspicious-account-
activity.html.  Furthermore, while sophisticated Online Service Providers (OSPs) 
may employ such measures, third parties—such as other users—frequently lack 
access to the wealth of data necessary for advanced identification processes. 
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username and password, the Internet doesn’t doubt your identity.  
Simply having a different username and password typically leads 
the Internet to believe that you are a different person altogether.9 
That anonymity makes many of the problems mentioned 
above much more difficult to resolve.  Without a clearly identifiable 
defendant, a plaintiff has little chance of recovery, and while 
anonymous defendants are not a phenomenon unique to the 
Internet, the prevalence of the Internet in modern society has 
exacerbated this problem.10  This article explores the mechanisms 
available to discover the identity of an otherwise anonymous 
Internet user, and discusses the complications—forum selection, 
service and notice, limited litigation tools available to anonymous 
defendants, opportunities for abuse, and burdens placed on 
disinterested third parties—inherent in litigating against an 
anonymous Internet defendant.  In particular, the authors seek to 
call attention to the inequitable treatment of anonymous Internet 
defendants, as exemplified by the limitations placed on them 
during litigation, the ease with which procedural abuses can be 
inflicted upon them, the complicity of otherwise disinterested third 
parties in ignoring the privacy rights of anonymous Internet 
defendants, and the continued neglect—of both judicial and 
legislative bodies—in addressing such issues.  To rectify the 
prejudicial and damaging atmosphere to which anonymous 
Internet defendants are subjected, four requirements must be 
diligently enforced: (1) courts must require complaints to comply 
fully with pleading rules, including those regarding propriety of 
jurisdiction and venue; (2) indications and allegations of counter-
facts—particularly those that tend to destroy jurisdiction and 
venue—must be addressed early and with all due seriousness; (3) 
there must be fastidious observation of joinder rules, such that 
permissive joinder and dismissal can no longer be abused to the 
detriment of anonymous Internet defendants; and (4) effective 
notice must be given to putative defendants. 
 
 9. See, e.g., Paul Cockerton, Time to End Our Reliance on Unique Users, PAUL 
COCKERTON (July 2, 2011, 5:41 PM), http://paulcockerton.wordpress.com/2011/ 
07/02/time-to-end-the-reliance-on-unique-users/. 
 10. See Nathaniel Gleicher, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent Legal 
Standard, 118 YALE L.J. 320, 323 (2008) (“From anonymous message boards 
criticizing massive corporations, to citizens who scrutinize elected officials, to 
websites that enable the anonymous release of government and corporate 
documents, the Internet has expanded the cape of anonymity to shield an army of 
pamphleteers.”). 
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II. THE RIGHT TO SPEAK ANONYMOUSLY 
An oft-quoted passage from McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Commission, explaining the justifications for anonymous speech, 
reads: 
Protections for anonymous speech are vital to democratic 
discourse.  Allowing dissenters to shield their identities 
frees them to express critical, minority views . . . 
Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority. . . . 
It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, 
and of the First Amendment in particular: to protect 
unpopular individuals from retaliation . . . at the hand of 
an intolerant society.11 
As the above passage suggests, there is a right to anonymity.  This 
section will examine the justifications—constitutional, 
jurisprudential, and societal—supporting the right to be 
anonymous and the right to speak anonymously.  Although these 
rights have long since been established,12 a clear understanding of 
the scope and extent of their reach is necessary for proper 
understanding of the plight of the anonymous defendant, and the 
import of the rights that he or she is made to surrender under our 
current procedural scheme. 
The Supreme Court cases that have discussed anonymous 
speech have for the most part noted that it has been protected 
because there is a valuable tradition in protecting speech.13  Many 
cases note that famous authors and our Founding Fathers wrote 
anonymously to protect themselves from retribution, or simply to 
protect their privacy.14  The Court has stated that “an author’s 
decision to remain anonymous . . . is an aspect of the freedom of 
speech protected by the First Amendment,”15 and that 
“[a]nonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority.”16 
In many of these cases, dissenting jurists have pointed out that 
there should be no broad right to anonymity.  For example, Justice 
Scalia in McIntyre stated that “[anonymity] facilitates wrong by 
eliminating accountability, which is ordinarily the very purpose of 
 
 11. Anonymity, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., http://www.eff.org/issues 
/anonymity (last visited Sept. 11, 2011) (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995)). 
 12. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 343. 
 13. Id. 
 14. E.g., id. 
 15. Id. at 342. 
 16. Id. at 357 (citing JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS ON 
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 1, 3–4 (R. McCallum ed. 1947)). 
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the anonymity.”17  Determining who is wrongfully avoiding 
accountability and who is rightly avoiding unfair retribution is 
difficult, but there should be some clear procedural rules to guide 
judges in determining when unmasking anonymous parties is fair 
game. 
A. Anonymity as a Protection from Retaliation 
Unpopular speech is always in great need of protection and 
anonymity.  In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,18 an Alabama 
corporations law required disclosure of membership lists of the 
NAACP.19  In a unanimous decision, the Court stated that 
anonymity is tied to the rights of free speech and free association, 
and that, in this circumstance, disclosure would have a chilling 
effect.20  The Court recognized that many residents of Alabama 
who normally would associate with the NAACP might not do so if 
their association was publicly known.21  “[I]mmunity from state 
scrutiny of [Petitioner’s] membership lists . . . is here so related to 
the right of the members to pursue their lawful private interests 
privately and to associate freely with others in doing so as to come 
within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.”22 
In Talley v. California,23 a Los Angeles ordinance forbade 
anonymous posters and advertisements in an effort to curb false 
advertising, libel, and fraud.24  Handbills were distributed that 
urged the boycott of several businesses and businessmen who did 
not offer equal employment opportunities to “Negroes, Mexicans, 
and Orientals.”25  The handbills had the address of “National 
Consumers Mobilization” printed on them but did not list any 
person’s name.26  Because the ordinance was not limited to 
offensive or obscene advertising and was not solely curbing fraud as 
it claimed, the Supreme Court held that it was an infringement of 
free speech.27  There was no showing of a problem with libelous or 
 
 17. Id. at 385 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 18. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
 19. Id. at 451. 
 20. Id. at 466. 
 21. Id. at 462. 
 22. Id. at 466. 
 23. 362 U.S. 60 (1960). 
 24. Id. at 60–61, 64. 
 25. Id. at 61. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 64 (“[A]s in Griffin, the ordinance here is not limited to handbills 
whose content is ‘obscene or offensive to public morals or that advocates unlawful 
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fraudulent handbills, so the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to 
protect speech.28  However, the dissent noted that there was also no 
clear showing of a threat of retribution to the speakers.29  The 
decision in Talley has paved the way for broad protection of 
anonymous speech because it can be assumed that in speech that 
criticizes, whether political or not, there is a potential for 
retribution, and an author has the right to protect his or her 
identity if he or she chooses. 
In Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Committee,30 the 
Supreme Court carved out an exception for anonymous speech 
from the general rule on campaign contribution disclosures set out 
in Buckley v. Valeo.31  The Court held that Ohio’s campaign 
disclosure requirements could not constitutionally be applied to 
minor parties such as the Socialist Workers Party.32  If either 
contribution or involvement was publicized, contributors and 
recipients would be subject to harassment and reprisals—
specifically, those associated with the Socialist Workers Party feared 
that they would be fired or denied employment in the future.33  
This contrasts with the general rule of Buckley that the state interest 
in fair elections outweighs any need for anonymity in campaign 
contributions.34   
 The Brown case highlights the flexibility available for decisions 
involving political speech.  When there is a risk of chilling speech 
because of retribution to speakers based on their views, there can 
and should be exceptions to protect those speakers with unpopular 
or minority viewpoints. 
B. Anonymity and Compelled Identification in the Political Arena 
The case that is most often cited for the proposition that there 
is a right to speak anonymously is McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Commission.35  In 1988, Margaret McIntyre passed out leaflets that 
 
conduct.’ . . . Therefore we do not pass on the validity of an ordinance limited to 
prevent these or any other supposed evils.” (quoting Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 
U.S. 444, 451 (1938))). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 69 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
 30. 459 U.S. 87 (1982). 
 31. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 32. Brown, 459 U.S. at 101–02. 
 33. Id. at 99. 
 34. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 72. 
 35. 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
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were meant to persuade people to vote against a school levy.36  The 
leaflets were signed “CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAX PAYERS,” 
and argued that the local school district had wasted money in 
previous levies and that “WASTE CAN NO LONGER BE 
TOLERATED.”37  Ohio law, at the time, prohibited anonymous 
political advertisements promoting a candidate or issue that would 
be decided in an upcoming election.38  The scope of the law in 
McIntyre was narrower than the law in Talley because the Ohio law 
only applied to speech intended to influence the outcome of an 
election, and the alleged state interest was to prevent libel and 
fraud and provide the electorate with relevant information.39 
The Court held that the exacting scrutiny standard was not 
met by the Ohio law.40  When political speech is involved, any law 
that would restrict that speech must be narrowly tailored to a 
compelling state interest.41  The majority also noted the great 
tradition of anonymous political speech as well as anonymous 
literature.42  “The right to remain anonymous may be abused when 
it shields fraudulent conduct.  But political speech by its nature will 
sometimes have unpalatable consequences, and, in general, our 
society accords greater weight to the value of free speech than to 
the dangers of its misuse.”43  In a concurring opinion, Justice 
Thomas wrote that the text of the First Amendment must have 
been intended to protect anonymous speech at the time it was 
 
 36. Id. at 337. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 338. The applicable provision reads:  
No person shall write, print, post or distribute, or cause to be written, 
printed, posted or distributed, a notice, placard, dodger, advertisement, 
sample ballot, or any other form of general publication which is designed 
to promote the nomination or election or defeat of a candidate, or to 
promote the adoption or defeat of any issue, or to influence the voters in 
any election, or make an expenditure for the purpose of financing 
political communications through newspapers, magazines, outdoor 
advertising facilities, direct mailings, or other similar types of general 
public political advertising, or through flyers, handbills, or other non-
periodical printed matter, unless there appears on such form of 
publication in a conspicuous place or is contained within said statement 
the name and residence or business address of the chairman, treasurer, 
or secretary of the organization issuing the same, or the person who 
issues, makes or is responsible therefor. 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09(A) (West 1988). 
 39. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 344, 348.  
 40. Id. at 347. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 357. 
 43. Id. 
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written because many of the founders in fact practiced anonymous 
speech.44  However, Justice Scalia’s dissent noted that forty-nine 
states have laws that prohibit anonymous speech in campaigns, and 
there is nothing in the text of the Constitution that explicitly 
provides a right to anonymity.45   
McIntyre has been one of the most-cited cases dealing with 
anonymity, and it contains at least two methods of looking at the 
question of anonymous speech.  First, it notes that there is a 
tradition of protecting anonymous speech in our country.46  This 
tradition is based on a deference given to authors to choose 
whether to identify themselves because that is a part of the message 
being conveyed, meaning that requiring identification is compelled 
speech.47  The other method is to consider whether identification 
of an author will have an effect on whether the speech is made at 
all.48  If self-identification is required, some may be less likely to 
speak, which would create an infringement of speech.49   
In Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation,50 the 
Supreme Court struck down Colorado laws that required initiative-
petitioners to be registered voters and to wear a name-badge stating 
whether they were paid or volunteer, and to provide a list of all 
paid workers.51  Even though the petitioners would not be 
anonymous to those who knew them, the Court held that they had 
the right not to disclose their identities through identification 
badges.52  
The right to be anonymous while publicly canvassing and 
promoting a cause has been reaffirmed in Watchtower Bible v. 
Stratton.53  In that case, the Village of Stratton prohibited canvassing 
on residential properties without a permit.54  Again, part of the 
decision rested on the right to maintain anonymity while exercising 
First Amendment rights.55   
If the Supreme Court has made anything clear in its decisions 
 
 44. Id. at 358–61 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 45. See id. at 385 (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
 46. Id. at 357. 
 47. Id. at 342. 
 48. Id.   
 49. See id. at 355. 
 50. 525 U.S. 182 (1999). 
 51. Id. at 186, 200. 
 52. Id. at 200. 
 53. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 
150 (2002). 
 54. Id. at 154. 
 55. Id. at 167. 
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over the last half-century, it is that there is some protection for 
anonymity in the context of the First Amendment.56  Of the 
Internet cases discussed below, few involve compelled disclosure, 
but rather a choice as to whether to allow an anonymous person to 
be identified after alleged wrongful acts have occurred.57  Still, the 
Supreme Court cases discussed above can provide several helpful 
ideas about anonymity.  Anonymity is to be protected when not 
doing so would impair the exercise of First Amendment rights.58  
Anonymity can be protected because compelling disclosure is 
equivalent to compelling speech, and there is a strong tradition of 
anonymous political speech that can be traced to our nation’s 
founding.59  
III. INEQUITABLE TREATMENT OF ANONYMOUS DEFENDANTS 
This section will present the processes and procedures used to 
unmask anonymous defendants and will then explore the problems 
to which such practices give rise.  These problems have persisted 
for some time,60 and their net effect is the unfair and inequitable 
treatment of defendants who wish to remain anonymous.61  
Unfortunately, that disparity exists at nearly every stage in 
litigation, making it almost impossible for an anonymous 
defendant to retain his or her rights to privacy and anonymity. 
At present, anonymous defendants are faced with several 
unique hurdles during litigation.  For example, while an 
anonymous plaintiff who wishes to remain anonymous during the 
course of a suit is armed with the full repertoire of procedural tools 
necessary for full and vigorous litigation,62 an otherwise anonymous 
 
 56. See, e.g., id. at 167; Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 
182 (1999); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
 57. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 58. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible, 536 U.S. at 167. 
 59. See, e.g., McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357 (“Under our Constitution, anonymous 
pamphleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable 
tradition of advocacy and of dissent.”). 
 60. See, e.g., Carol M. Rice, Meet John Doe: It Is Time for Federal Civil Procedure to 
Recognize John Doe Parties, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 883, 885 (1996) (explaining that 
litigants in English courts began using pseudonyms more than three centuries 
ago). 
 61. See id. at 894–907. 
 62. See, e.g., Aaron Morris, Dude, Who’s My Plaintiff?—Courts Allow Anonymous 
Plaintiffs, BUS. L. ALERT (Dec. 1, 2008), http://www.businesslawalert.com/2008/12 
/articles/defamation/dude-whos-my-plaintiff-courts-allow-anonymous-plaintiffs/ 
(“On August 12, 2008, the Second District U.S. Court of Appeals reaffirmed the 
national and local trend toward recognizing a litigant’s right to proceed 
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defendant seeking to protect that anonymity has his or her arsenal 
limited to motions to quash subpoenas seeking to discover 
information about his or her identity.63  Furthermore, proceedings 
deciding whether to disclose the defendant’s identity are instigated 
at the whim of the plaintiff, often in the improper forum, with 
inadequate service and notice, and with only the barest effort 
expended to ascertain whether the soon-to-be-identified defendant 
is the proper party against whom suit should be brought.64  
Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are largely silent or 
unclear on the matter of anonymous defendants,65 leaving various 
jurisdictions to develop different methods for dealing with 
anonymous parties.66  Unfortunately, although the difficulties 
facing anonymous defendants have long been known,67 modern 
pleading and discovery rules remain inadequate to address and 
resolve these problems.68 
A. How Anonymous Defendants Are Identified 
Anonymous defendants come in varying degrees of anonymity.  
In BitTorrent69 piracy cases, for example, defendants are often 
 
anonymously through the courts.”). 
 63. This is due to the procedural stage of the suit at the time when the 
defendant’s identity is at risk of disclosure.  Greater detail is provided in the 
discussion infra Part III.A.  See also Potential Legal Challenges to Anonymity, CITIZEN 
MEDIA L. PROJECT, http://www.citmedialaw.org/legal-guide/potential 
-legal-challenges-anonymity (last updated Apr. 22, 2010) (“[Defendants] also have 
the legal right to contest a subpoena seeking to reveal [their] identity.  [They] 
usually do this by filing a ‘motion to quash’ the subpoena . . . .”). 
 64. See VPR Internationale v. Does 1–1017, No. 11-2068, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 64656, at *3 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 2011) (“In this case, not a single one of the 
plaintiff’s 1,017 potential adversaries has been identified.  There is no adversarial 
process yet.  Moreover, VPR ignores the fact that IP subscribers are not necessarily 
copyright infringers.”). 
 65. See, e.g., Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1–1,062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332, 
341–45 (D.D.C. 2011) (discussing the issue of whether mass joinder of anonymous 
defendants is addressed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 66. Compare Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 445–56 (Md. 
2009) (imposing stringent requirements prior to identification of anonymous 
individuals, including an assessment of the strength of the underlying defamation 
case), with Donkeyball Movie, LLC, v. Does 1–171, No. 10–1520 (BAH), 2011 WL 
1807452, at *2–8 (D.D.C. May 12, 2011) (“[T]he putative defendant’s First 
Amendment right to anonymity . . . is minimal and outweighed by the plaintiff’s 
need for putative defendant’s identifying information in order to protect its 
copyrights.”). 
 67. See, e.g., Rice, supra note 60, at 885. 
 68. Id. at 913–45. 
 69. BitTorrent is a popular peer-to-peer file sharing protocol, whereby files 
are broken into small pieces and distributed in such a way that recipients can 
10
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initially identified by an Internet Protocol (IP) address,70 which is 
necessarily distributed to fellow users in order to facilitate file 
sharing.  In other instances, such identifying information may be 
unavailable and the defendant may actually be truly anonymous.71  
Because the focus of this article is on the treatment of defendants 
who are at risk of identification, more attention will be given to 
those defendants that are less than fully anonymous. 
Where some potentially identifying information is available, 
plaintiffs may use that information to name defendants 
pseudonymously, employing the discovery process to further 
identify defendants.72  Often in the case of Internet defendants, the 
true identity of the party corresponding to the potentially 
identifying information can be obtained from a third-party online 
service provider (OSP), such as an Internet service provider (ISP), 
forum administrator, message board operator, e-mail provider, or 
online merchant.73  Frequently, these OSPs record some amount of 
information to facilitate identification.74  For example, an e-mail 
provider may log the IP address of the sender while the ISP that 
supplied that IP address records to which of its subscribers the IP 
address had been assigned.75  Thus, through a bit of detective work, 
it may be possible to obtain the name and address for an online 
service user.76 
 
often obtain them from fellow downloaders, rather than the source, thereby 
easing the burden on the original uploader.  See The Basics of BitTorrent, 
BITTORRENT, http://www.bittorrent.com/help/manual/chapter0201 (last visited 
Sept. 9, 2011). 
 70. An IP address is a unique number assigned to each device on a network 
used to direct network traffic to and from the correct device.  IP Address Overview: 
The Basics on IP Addresses, THE INTERNET DIG. (Oct. 25, 2004), http:// 
www.theinternetdigest.net/articles/ip-address-overview.html.  IP addresses are 
frequently provided by those who supply access to the Internet, known as internet 
service providers.  See id. 
 71. See Roberto Aringhieri et al., Fuzzy Techniques for Trust and Reputation 
Management in Anonymous Peer-to-Peer Systems, 57 J. AM. SOC’Y FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH. 
528, 529 (2006).  
 72. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U.S. 388, 390 n.2 (1971). 
 73. See Information Stored by Third Parties, SURVEILLANCE SELF-DEFENSE PROJECT, 
https://ssd.eff.org/3rdparties (last visited Sept. 10, 2011).   
 74. See id. 
 75. H.R. 1981, 112th Cong. § 4(h) (2011) (“A provider of an electronic 
communication service or remote computing service shall retain for a period of at 
least 18 months the temporarily assigned network addresses the service assigns to 
each account, unless that address is transmitted by radio communication (as 
defined in section 3 of the Communications Act of 1934).”). 
 76. It may not be possible to accurately identify the proper plaintiff from the 
IP address alone, because multiple persons—authorized or not—may be sharing 
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In practice, first, the plaintiff sues a fictitious “John Doe.”77  
The plaintiff then obtains the court’s permission to subpoena 
identifying information from the relevant OSPs.78  Once the 
plaintiff obtains such information from the OSPs, the plaintiff 
amends the complaint to name the person identified by the OSPs.79  
Frequently, the OSPs will notify the relevant person that the 
plaintiff is trying to obtain his or her information.80  If the person 
whose identity is to be revealed objects to such disclosure, he or she 
is limited to filing a motion to quash the subpoena.81  This is 
because he or she is technically not yet a party to the action,82 and 
therefore does not have access to all the tools of litigation, such as 
motions to dismiss or for summary judgment.83 In practice, this 
leaves a would-be defendant without any way to protect his or her 
privacy until it has already been invaded. 
If the motion to quash is unsuccessful, the court may hold a 
hearing, during which the defendant can more fully oppose 
disclosure of his or her identifying information.84  It should be 
 
the same Internet connection.  See, e.g., Carolyn Thompson, NY Child Pornography 
Case Underscores Wi-Fi Privacy Dangers, AOL NEWS (Apr. 24, 2011), http:// 
www.aolnews.com/2011/04/24/ny-child-pornography-case-underscores-wi-fi-
privacy-dangers/ (“People who keep an open wireless router won’t necessarily 
know when someone else is piggybacking on the signal, which usually reaches 
300–400 feet . . . .”). 
 77. Erik P. Lewis, Note, Unmasking “Anon12345”: Applying an Appropriate 
Standard When Private Citizens Seek the Identity of Anonymous Internet Defamation 
Defendants, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 954 (citing McMann v. Doe, 460 F. Supp. 2d 
259, 262–63 (D. Mass. 2006)).  
 78. Donkeyball Movie, LLC v. Does 1–171, No. 10-1520 (BAH), 2011 WL 
1807452, at *9 (D.D.C. May 12, 2011) (“To be clear, at this stage in the 
proceedings, the plaintiff is engaged in discovery to identify the proper defendants 
to be named in this lawsuit, including whether the exercise of jurisdiction over 
each potential defendant is proper.”). 
 79. See id. at *1 (stating that the plaintiff had been given leave “to obtain 
identifying information for the putative defendants” because the defendants “were 
unidentified at the time the plaintiff filed its Complaint”). 
 80. See, e.g., id. (explaining that the court ordered the putative defendants’ 
OSPs to send notices to them so the defendants could challenge the release of 
their information). 
 81. Id. at *9 (“If and when the putative defendant is ultimately named in this 
lawsuit, she will have the opportunity to file an appropriate motion challenging 
the Court’s jurisdiction, and the Court will be able to evaluate her personal 
jurisdiction defense and consider dismissal.  Until that time, however, dismissal 
under Rule 12(b)(2) is inappropriate.” (citing London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 
542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 180–81 (D. Mass. 2008))). 
 82. See McMann v. Doe, 460 F. Supp. 2d 259, 266 (D. Mass. 2006) (“[T]his 
motion must be considered ex parte because John Doe is not known.”). 
 83. See Donkeyball Movie, 2011 WL 1807452, at *8–9. 
 84. Lewis, supra note 77, at 954. 
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noted that this hearing is held in the court initially selected by the 
plaintiff when filing suit, which occurred before the plaintiff had 
ascertained the identity of the defendant;85 thus, a host of defects 
with respect to jurisdiction, venue, and notice may exist.86  These 
issues will be discussed later in this section.87 
Courts have struggled to reach a consistent approach in 
deciding whether to allow plaintiffs to use discovery to identify the 
putative defendant.88  Seeking to balance the interests of the 
plaintiff with those of the defendant and to provide opportunities 
for redress without “demand[ing] the court system unmask every 
insolent, disagreeable, or fiery anonymous online figure,”89 two 
standards have emerged.90  The more recent—and more 
exacting—of the two was put forth by the Delaware Supreme Court 
in its 2005 Doe v. Cahill decision.91  The older standard was 
articulated by the Virginia Circuit Court in In re Subpoena Duces 
Tecum to America Online, Inc. in 2000.92   
The America Online standard requires that the plaintiff have a 
“legitimate, good faith basis” for jurisdiction where the suit was 
filed, and that the identity of the putative defendant is necessary for 
litigation.93  In contrast, the Cahill standard requires that: (1) the 
plaintiff must provide notice of his discovery request by replying to 
the original message; and (2) the plaintiff must support his claim 
with sufficient facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment.94  
 
 85. Id. 
 86. See, e.g., id. (mentioning that if a plaintiff files in federal court based on 
diversity of citizenship, and the defendant, upon revealing himself, turns out to be 
a citizen of the same state as the plaintiff, then diversity is defeated). 
 87. See infra Parts III.B–C. 
 88. See Ryan M. Martin, Comment, Freezing the Net: Rejecting a One-Size-Fits-All 
Standard for Unmasking Anonymous Internet Speakers in Defamation Lawsuits, 75 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 1217, 1227 (2007) (“Courts . . . have applied different standards for 
determining whether an anonymous source should be unmasked . . . .”). 
 89. McMann, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 266. 
 90. Lewis, supra note 77, at 954. 
 91. 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005); see also Kevin McBride, Discovery of Anonymous 
Online Speakers, MCBRIDE L., PC (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.mcbride-law.com 
/2011/03/08/discovery-of-anonymous-online-speakers (“The district court in the 
9th Circuit matter on appeal applied the most exacting standard, established by 
the Delaware Supreme Court in Doe v. Cahill.  The Cahill standard requires 
plaintiffs to be able to survive a hypothetical motion for summary judgment and give, or 
attempt to give, notice to the speaker before discovering the anonymous speaker’s identity.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 92. 52 Va. Cir. 26, 37 (2000), rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Am. 
Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 461. 
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The Cahill court expressly rejected the America Online standard 
because “[America Online’s] ‘good faith’ standard is too easily 
satisfied to protect sufficiently a defendant’s right to speak 
anonymously.”95  Legal commentators have also noted that neither 
the America Online court nor any other has ever explained how one 
satisfies the good faith basis requirement.96  Given the difficulties 
involved in applying the America Online standard, courts have been 
employing the Cahill standard with greater frequency.97 
Regardless of the standard applied, it appears that courts are 
generally willing to allow the plaintiff to proceed with expedited 
discovery so as to uncover the identity of the would-be defendant.98  
This trend appears to be slowing, however, with respect to cases 
with multiple anonymous Internet defendants—so-called “reverse 
class action” cases—such as in Internet piracy cases.99  Although 
these cases are recent (within the past year and some currently 
undecided and subject to appeal),100 several legal commentators 
suggest that such a shift may signal that the judiciary has come to 
understand the plight of the anonymous defendant.101 
B. Issues with Pleadings 
Initiating a case with one or more anonymous parties presents 
the problem of pleading unknown facts.  For example, Rule 
8(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a 
pleading have “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the 
court’s jurisdiction . . . .”102  In the case of an anonymous 
 
 95. Id. at 458. 
 96. See Lewis, supra note 77, at 957–58 (citing Martin, supra note 88, at 1228); 
see also Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 241 (Ct. App. 2008) (“[The good 
faith standard] offers no practical, reliable way to determine the plaintiff’s good 
faith and leaves the speaker with little protection.”). 
 97. See, e.g., Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). 
 98. See Arista Records LLC v. Does 1–19, 551 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2008) 
(noting “the overwhelming number of cases where courts have . . . permitted 
expedited discovery in circumstances similar to the present.”). 
 99. See, e.g., VPR Internationale v. Does 1-1017, No. 11-2068, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 64656 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 2011); Millennium TGA, Inc. v. Does 1-800, No. 10 
C 5603, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35406 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2011); IO Group, Inc. v. 
Does 1-435, No. C 10-04382 SI, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14123 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 
2011). 
 100. See, e.g., VPR Internationale,  2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64656. 
 101. See, e.g., Robert Z. Cashman, Dead on Arrival—Judge Did Not Allow Plaintiff 
Attorneys to Subpoena the ISPs, FED. COMPUTER CRIMES (May 3, 2011), http:// 
torrentlawyer.wordpress.com/2011/05/03/john-doe-lawsuit-denied-expedited-
discovery-no-access-to-isp-data/. 
 102. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1). 
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defendant, is it possible to plead ignorance or is it necessary to have 
a good faith basis for proceeding in a particular court?  Recent file-
sharing cases again provide examples of how courts have differing 
interpretations of the rules and their procedural effects.   
Some courts have responded to a motion to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction by ruling that motions to dismiss are 
premature until an anonymous defendant is named and served, 
thereby allowing jurisdictional discovery.103  However, in cases 
where an anonymous defendant is known by an IP address, it may 
be possible to approximately determine where the anonymous 
defendant is located.  IP geolocation is the practice of determining 
a user’s geographical location through their IP address, and has 
been available since 1999.104  A few courts have now recognized that 
IP geolocation may provide sufficient information to indicate that 
jurisdiction and venue are not appropriate where the IP addresses 
appear to be coming from places outside the district where the case 
has been filed.105  
The appropriate standard for pleadings should not have to 
change due to the presence of an anonymous party.  In cases 
involving an anonymous party known only by a username, or with 
no facts suggesting geographical location, it may be appropriate to 
allow jurisdictional discovery in any district.  However, at a 
minimum, a party should be required to plead a good faith reason 
to believe that, upon identification, the claims would survive a 
motion to dismiss.106  Where a party knows only evidence that 
would contradict an allegation, such as the appropriateness of 
venue, jurisdictional discovery seems inappropriate.  
 
 103. See, e.g., West Bay One, Inc. v. Does 1-1,653, 270 F.R.D. 13, 15 n.2 (D.D.C. 
2010); London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Mass. 2008); 
Virgin Records Am., Inc. v. Does 1-35, No. CIV.A. 05-1918(CKK), 2006 WL 
1028956, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 18, 2006). 
 104. See Stephanie Olsen, Digital Envoy Wins Geotargeting Patent, CNET NEWS 
(June 29, 2004), http://news.cnet.com/Digital-Envoy-wins-geotargeting-patent 
/2110-1032_3-5251844.html. 
 105. See, e.g., Nu Image, Inc. v. Does 1-23,322, No. 11-cv-00301(RLW), 2011 WL 
3240562, at *4 (D.D.C. July 29, 2011) (“Thus, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has 
a good faith basis to believe a putative defendant may be a District of Columbia 
resident if a geolocation service places his/her IP address within the District of 
Columbia, or within a city located within 30 miles of the District of Columbia.  
Without this threshold good faith showing, the Court finds Plaintiff’s motion for 
expedited discovery inappropriate, as it would otherwise be based on Plaintiff’s 
mere conjecture or speculation . . . .”). 
 106. See, e.g., In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26, 
37 (2000), rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous 
Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001). 
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C. Abuses of Process 
In light of the disparity between courts and the inconsistent 
application of standards—or rather, the lack of a consistent 
standard—it comes as no surprise that anonymous defendants are 
subjected to various abuses under the current scheme.  Under our 
justice system, anonymous Internet defendants are particularly 
vulnerable because their desire to retain their anonymity often 
compels them to strike unbalanced settlement agreements,107 to 
refrain from responding to lesser abuses,108 and to neglect to use 
the proper degree of discretion in seeking and retaining legal 
counsel.109  Furthermore, in addition to the forum and notice 
deficiencies detailed in earlier sections,110 problems of which the 
courts have long been cognizant, anonymous Internet defendants 
 
 107. See, e.g., Eryk Salvaggio & Kurt Klappenbach, File-Sharing Settlements Target 
34 UMS Students, THE MAINE CAMPUS (Nov. 19, 2007), http:// 
mainecampus.com/2007/11/19/file-sharing-settlements-target-34-ums-students/ 
(discussing the impact of a bill that would link financial aid funding to a school’s 
willingness to test technological deterrents to file-sharing, and noting that  
“[w]hile this bill is working through Congress, the RIAA announced that 417 pre-
litigation settlement letters had been sent to college students nation-wide . . . .”); 
see also Nate Anderson, P2P Lawyer: More Settlements Since Former-Lobbyist Judge’s 
Ruling, ARS TECHNICA L. & DISORDER (Apr. 12, 2011), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2011/04/p2p-lawyer-more-settlements-since-former-lobbyist-judges-
ruling.ars (“[M]ore anonymous P2P defendants are coming forward to settle.”).  
But see David Kravets, Settlement Rejected in ‘Shocking’ RIAA File Sharing Verdict, WIRED 
THREAT LEVEL (Jan. 27, 2010, 2:47 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/ 
01/settlement-rejected-in-shocking-riaa-file-sharing-verdict/ (“‘She is rejecting 
[the RIAA’s settlement offer],’ Joe Sibley, one of Thomas-Rasset’s lawyers, said in a 
telephone interview.  ‘I think it proves our point.  They want to use this case as a 
bogeyman to scare people into doing what they want, to pay exorbitant 
damages.’”). 
 108. See Paul Alan Levy, Litigating Civil Subpoenas to Identify Anonymous Internet 
Speakers, 37 LITIGATION, no. 3, 2011 at 27, 30, available at http://www.citizen.org 
/documents/litigating-civil-subpoenas-to-identify-anonymous-internet-apeakers-
paul-alan-levy.pdf (“[T]he most common response [if the defendant has hired a 
lawyer] on the part of the plaintiffs’ lawyers is either to drop the case or to file no 
opposition [to the defendants’ motions to quash]. . . . What this tells me is that 
these plaintiffs sought discovery to identify their critics without having any real 
intention of going forward with [their] . . . case.”). 
 109. See David L. Sobel, The Process that “John Doe” is Due: Addressing the Legal 
Challenge to Internet Anonymity, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3, 21 n.36 (2000) (“John Doe 
defendants do not have the option of appearing pro se for two reasons.  First, a 
personal appearance would obviously negate a defendant’s efforts to conceal his 
or her identity.  Second, suits against John Does are frequently filed in 
jurisdictions distant to the defendants.  As a result, anonymous defendants who 
wish to protect their identities are compelled to incur the expense of retaining 
counsel to represent them (assuming they are able to locate counsel in a distant 
jurisdiction on short notice).”). 
 110. See supra Part III.B. 
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are saddled with additional procedural burdens and risks of less 
obvious harms.  Given the anonymous nature of the defendants, 
plaintiffs are afforded a certain degree of freedom in the pleading 
and discovery processes that necessarily invades the privacy of 
would-be defendants after clearing notably low hurdles.111 
One of the more pernicious forms of abuse inflicted by 
plaintiffs is the practice of voluntary dismissal, followed by 
additional joinder.112  Under this practice, plaintiffs initially file suit 
against a large number of anonymous defendants, and provide 
notice through the defendants’ OSPs.113  Defendants can either 
wait until the plaintiff has availed itself of the discovery process and 
uncovered their identity, or take on an active role in the action.  
During this time, settlement offers are communicated from the 
plaintiff to the putative defendants.114  These settlement offers 
typically demand that the defendant pay a sum of money, admit 
fault, and agree to refrain from repeating the behavior, in 
exchange for the plaintiff waiving his or her right to bring suit.115  
Once the plaintiff feels he or she has successfully reached as many 
settlement agreements as are likely, or if the current crop of 
defendants is particularly uncooperative, the plaintiff dismisses all 
but a handful of defendants, and joins many more, repeating the 
process.116  In this way, the plaintiff is able to avoid aggregating 
filing fees and costs while reaching the greatest number of 
potential defendants (thereby accumulating the greatest amount of 
settlement payments).117 
Particularly in mass file-sharing cases, plaintiffs have brought 
suit against a multitude of defendants, with the only rationale for 
the grouping being that the same copyrighted work was 
downloaded.118  In these suits, the defendants were often from 
 
 111. See supra Part III.A. 
 112. See, e.g., CP Productions, Inc. v. Does 1–300, No. 10 C 6255, 2011 WL 
737761, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 2011). 
 113. See, e.g., id. 
 114. See, e.g., id. 
 115. See, e.g., id. 
 116. See, e.g., id. 
 117. See, e.g., id. (“No predicate has been shown for thus combining 300 
separate actions on the cheap—if CP had sued the 300 claimed infringers 
separately for their discrete infringements, the filing fees alone would have 
aggregated $105,000 rather than $350.”). 
 118. See, e.g., Boy Racer, Inc. v. Does 1–60, No. C 11–01738 SI, 2011 WL 
3652521, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2011) (“Plaintiff claims that the Doe defendants 
illegally reproduced and distributed plaintiff’s copyrighted creative work ‘A Punk 
Rock Orgy in the Woods’ . . . .”). 
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different states, downloaded the file at different times and from 
different sources, and, in some instances, downloaded different 
files.119  This would be analogous to joining separate and unrelated 
crimes committed by separate and unrelated criminals simply 
because the same model of television was stolen.  Without a 
substantial factual nexus, joinder is clearly improper,120 yet, because 
the technology is complex,121 and due to the potentially high cost 
of bringing similar suits against possibly thousands of defendants,122 
courts have been willing to permit such joinder during the early 
stages of litigation.123 
Another abuse visited upon anonymous defendants is the 
threat of identification and association with potentially 
embarrassing or shameful practices.  For example, in CP 
Productions, Inc. v. Does 1-300, the alleged harm was the defendants’ 
unauthorized downloading of a pornographic film titled “Cowgirl 
Creampie.”124  Many similar cases exist wherein the plaintiff uses 
the potentially embarrassing nature of the material downloaded to 
coerce settlement from the putative defendants who are at risk of 
being unmasked.125  In situations like these, the plaintiff takes 
advantage of the considerable leverage afforded by the shame and 
humiliation that would be inflicted upon the defendant were he or 
 
 119. Id. at *3–4. 
 120. See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2) (“Persons . . . may be joined in one action as 
defendants if: (A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in 
the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of 
transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all 
defendants will arise in the action.”) (emphasis added). 
 121. See Call of the Wild Movie v. Does 1–1,062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332, 345 
(D.D.C. 2011) (“Given the administrative burden of simply obtaining sufficient 
identifying information to properly name and serve alleged infringers, it is highly 
unlikely that the plaintiffs could protect their copyrights in a cost-effective 
manner.”); This is How We Catch You Downloading, TORRENTFREAK (Apr. 14, 2007), 
http://torrentfreak.com/this-is-how-we-catch-you-downloading/ (detailing a 
process used to trace users connecting to P2P networks). 
 122. See, e.g., CP Productions, 2011 WL 737761, at *1 (“[I]f CP had sued the 300 
claimed infringers separately . . . the filing fees alone would have aggregated 
$105,000 rather than $350.”).  
 123. See, e.g., VPR Internationale v. Does 1–17, No. C 11-01494 LB, 2011 WL 
1465836, *1–3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2011).  
 124. 2011 WL 737761, at *1. 
 125. See Liberty Media Holdings, LLC v. Colo. Members of Swarm of Nov. 16, 
2010 to Jan. 31, 2011, No. 11-cv-01171-WYD-KMT, 2011 WL 1812654, at *1−2 (D. 
Colo. May 12, 2011) (permitting discovery for the purpose of identifying 
defendants who allegedly downloaded gay pornography); see also Nate Anderson, 
Meet Evan Stone, P2P Pirate Hunter, ARS TECHNICA L. & DISORDER (Feb. 7, 2011), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/02/meet-evan-stone-p2p-pirate-
hunter.ars. 
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she to be associated with the allegedly infringed content.  The 
defendant has a strong incentive to settle in order to retain 
anonymity—often accepting an otherwise disadvantageous offer—
even when he or she may have otherwise emerged victorious from 
litigation. 
A third form of abuse takes advantage not of the anonymous 
defendants, but of the third parties.126  Because third-party ISPs can 
be compelled by subpoena—indeed, most Internet service 
providers will refrain from disclosing subscriber information absent 
a court order127—to assist in ascertaining the identity of those 
associated with identifying information such as IP addresses, ISPs 
may suffer a significant burden in assisting litigation for which they 
have no interest in the outcome.  Particularly where hundreds of 
potential defendants are listed, ISPs may have to expend 
considerable time, resources, and manpower to provide the 
plaintiff with the requested information, as well as notify those 
whose information is at risk of disclosure.128  The use of the 
discovery process in this way pits the ISPs against their customers 
for the benefit of a party with whom the ISP may have had no 
previous association.129  Additionally, where plaintiffs have done 
little or nothing to determine the propriety of jurisdiction with 
 
 126. See, e.g., Jacqui Cheng, NFL Fumbles DMCA Takedown Battle, Could Face 
Sanctions, ARS TECHNICA UPTIME (Mar. 20, 2007), http://arstechnica.com/business 
/news/2007/03/nfl-fumbles-dmca-takedown-battle-could-face-sanctions.ars 
(discussing the National Football League’s abuse of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act takedown provisions by sending repeated takedown requests 
regarding the same content). 
 127. Becky Waring, ISPs Assist in Cutting Off File-Sharing Users, WINDOWS SECRETS 
(May 7, 2009), http://windowssecrets.com/top-story/isps-assist-in-cutting-off-file-
sharing-users (“[M]ost ISPs in the U.S. and other countries will release 
information about subscribers only when presented with a court order . . . .”); see 
also Office of Student Conduct, Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, U. OF PENNSYLVANIA OFF. OF 
STUDENT CONDUCT, http://www.upenn.edu/osc/pages/file_sharing.html (last 
visited Sept. 9, 2011) (“[M]any ISPs will not share subscriber information with 
copyright owners . . . .”). 
 128. See Evan Brown, Internet Law in the Courts, 14 J. INTERNET L. 32, 32–33 
(2011) (“Prosecuting a case against thousands of copyright infringement 
defendants is an enormous task, both for the plaintiffs’ attorneys as well as the ISPs 
who must respond to the subpoenas. Having so many defendants risks making the 
case unmanageable.”).  
 129. See In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26, 32 
(2000) rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous 
Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001) (“If AOL did not uphold the 
confidentiality of its subscribers, as it has contracted to do, absent extraordinary 
circumstances, one could reasonably predict that AOL subscribers would look to 
AOL’s competitors for anonymity. As such, the subpoena duces tecum at issue 
potentially could have an oppressive effect on AOL.”). 
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respect to its multiple defendants, the sting of this abuse is 
compounded by the fact that much of the ISP’s efforts and 
expenses may be for naught. 
The fourth type of abuse is the use of court proceedings to 
identify a defendant where no legitimate claim exists.130  A plaintiff 
can bring a false or tenuous claim solely for the purpose of 
identifying the defendant, dropping the claim after the defendant 
is called out.131  Such suits may have a chilling effect on otherwise 
free speech merely because those at risk of such suits are unwilling 
or unable to expend the time and resources to defend against 
allegations, however meritless.132  Indeed, some litigants have 
employed this strategy so successfully and so frequently as to have 
such behavior lambasted in popular media.133   
A final form of abuse is the result of inadequate notice.  While 
some case law supports a notice requirement,134 other cases are 
silent on the matter.135  Furthermore, even in those instances where 
notice is required, such notice is often insufficient.136  For example, 
the Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe No. 3 notice requirement is as 
follows: 
We hold that when such an application is made, the trial 
court should first require the plaintiff to undertake efforts 
to notify the anonymous posters that they are the subject 
of a subpoena or application for an order of disclosure, 
and withhold action to afford the fictitiously-named 
defendants a reasonable opportunity to file and serve 
opposition to the application.  These notification efforts 
 
 130. Levy, supra note 108, at 3 (discussing how plaintiffs seek discovery to 
identify their critics without having any real intention of going forward with their 
case).  
 131. Id. 
 132. See Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (W.D. Wash. 
2001).  
 133. See South Park: Trapped in the Closet (Comedy Central television broadcast 
Nov. 16, 2005), available at http://www.southparkstudios.com/full-episodes 
/s09e12-trapped-in-the-closet. 
 134. See Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712, 721 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); Krinsky 
v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 244 (Ct. App. 2008); Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 
460 (Del. 2005); Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 954 (D.C. 2009); Dendrite Int’l, 
Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
 135. See, e.g., In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26 
(2000) rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous 
Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001). 
 136. See Matthew Nied, Protecting Internet Anonymity: The Case for Providing Notice 
to Anonymous Defendants in Defamation Cases, L. IS COOL (Nov. 9, 2009), 
http://lawiscool.com/2009/11/09/protecting-internet-anonymity-the-case-for-
providing-notice-to-anonymous-defendants-in-defamation-cases. 
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should include posting a message of notification of the 
identity discovery request to the anonymous user on the 
ISP’s pertinent message board.137 
Given the plaintiff’s lack of reliable identifying information for the 
defendant, the Dendrite court required only that the plaintiff 
provide indirect notice, by posting a message on the “pertinent 
message board.”138  Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that 
anonymous defendants will check—or indeed, are even aware of 
the existence of—such message boards.  As a result, a would-be 
defendant may receive no notice of the proceedings in which his or 
her privacy is at risk. 
D. Third-Party Reactions When Subpoenaed 
Most ISPs or website operators have little motivation to either 
comply with a request to identify anonymous speakers (outside of a 
duty to respond to a subpoena) or to use their resources in 
protecting anonymous speakers.  Some ISPs have had subpoenas 
seeking the identities of anonymous parties successfully quashed,139 
or have been granted additional time to respond.140  However, 
these motions were apparently filed for the benefit of the ISPs, and 
it would not be reasonable to assume that an ISP will file a motion 
to quash a subpoena in most cases.  An ISP may simply have 
nothing to gain from costly legal defense. 
Additionally, website operators have very little risk of liability 
for most tort claims that would arise out of content created by an 
anonymous third party because section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act shields them from such tort liability.141  This law has 
been read broadly enough in some circumstances so that a website 
cannot be required to remove content even after a court has found 
that content to be defamatory.142  Further, a website does not have a 
 
 137. Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760. 
 138. Id. 
 139. LFP Internet Grp., LLC v. Does, No. 10-MC-122, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
5534, at *3 (D.S.D. Jan. 20, 2011) (granting Midcontinent Communications, Inc.’s 
motion to quash).   
 140. See Achte/Neunte Boll Kino Beteiligungs GMBh & Co. KG v. Does 1-4, 
577, No. 10-453 (RMC), 2010 WL 4905811, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 2010) (granting 
plaintiff’s motion for additional time to name and serve defendants while waiting 
for information from ISPs). 
 141. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2011).  In particular, “[n]o provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by another information content provider.”  Id. at (c)(1). 
 142. Blockowicz v. Williams, 675 F. Supp. 2d 912, 914–15 (N.D. Ill. 2009), aff’d, 
630 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 2010)  (holding that internet website hosts could not be 
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duty to keep records in order to obtain protection under section 
230, though some legal scholars have recommended that adequate 
record keeping be required in order to receive such immunity.143  If 
the ISP or website operator cannot be sued, and has no useful 
records to subpoena, a valid case may go nowhere against an 
anonymous defendant. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although the authors do not propose complete solutions to 
these problems, the following recommendations are offered as 
potential improvements that may alleviate some of the harm 
inflicted on anonymous Internet defendants as a result of our 
current system. 
First, each part of the complaint—including jurisdiction and 
venue—should be well-plead.  Rather than a simple recitation that 
“jurisdiction is believed to be proper,” plaintiffs bringing suit 
against anonymous defendants should be required to plead some 
facts as to why jurisdiction is proper.  Functionally, parties should 
be required to assert facts that tend to show the propriety of their 
jurisdiction and venue selections. 
One possible method of doing so would be for plaintiffs to use 
IP geolocation.  Although still far from perfect, modern 
geolocation is often accurate to approximately twenty-two miles,144 
and new techniques are emerging which are accurate to 
approximately four-tenths of a mile.145  While twenty-two miles may 
not be enough to personally identify the user associated with a 
specific IP address, it should oftentimes be sufficient to determine 
proper jurisdiction and venue.  Given the simplicity and negligible 
expense involved with this practice,146 the burden added by 
 
forced to remove defamatory statements from their sites when the host is not a 
party in the action); see also Mike Masnick, Two Courts Disagree on Whether or Not a 
Website Can Be Forced to Remove User-Created Defamatory Content, TECHDIRT (Jan. 4, 
2011, 4:30 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110102/00241112482/two-
courts-disagree-whether-not-website-can-be-forced-to-remove-user-created-
defamatory-content.shtml (explaining the decisions). 
 143.  See David Thompson, Fixing the CDA 230 Subsidy While Preserving Online 
Anonymity, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 10, 2010, 8:33 PM), http:// 
volokh.com/2010/06/10/fixing-the-cda-230-subsidy-while-preserving-online-
anonymity/. 
 144.  YONG WANG ET AL., TOWARDS STREET-LEVEL CLIENT-INDEPENDENT IP 
GEOLOCATION 1 (2011), available at http://www.usenix.org/event/nsdi11/tech 
/full_papers/Wang_Yong.pdf. 
 145. Id. at 1–2. 
 146. See Lookup IP Address Location, WHATISMYIPADDRESS.COM, http:// 
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requiring that plaintiffs take this small affirmative step is marginal 
and far outweighed by the assurance that most anonymous 
defendants will be subjected to suit only where jurisdiction and 
venue exist, thus saving both judicial and party resources.   
A second, related improvement would be to take seriously all 
indications of counter-facts.  Presently, courts often ignore the 
anonymous defendant’s assertion that jurisdiction or venue is 
improper,147 and instead permit the plaintiff to proceed with 
limited discovery for the purpose of determining the putative 
defendant’s identity (thus enabling the jurisdictional inquiry).148  
Similarly, some plaintiffs have continued to press for disclosure of 
identity even where facts, such as IP geolocation results, IP 
addresses belonging to ISPs that do not offer services within the 
district, or out-of-state letters from the would-be defendants’ 
attorneys asserting that jurisdiction is improper strongly suggest 
that jurisdiction or venue may be improper.149  Prohibiting 
plaintiffs from proceeding where there are clear indications of 
jurisdictional defects would save both judicial and party resources 
and help to ensure that the proper court hears the matter.  It 
would also limit the kinds of strategic abuse detailed in earlier 
sections150 and discourage parties who would be tempted to engage 
in such practices by requiring them to make a good faith inquiry 
where such indications are present. 
Third, rules of joinder must be fastidiously observed in cases 
with multiple anonymous Internet defendants.  Courts must cease 
to permit joinder in cases where traditionally required elements, 
such as common instrumentalities, shared time and place, or 
concerted efforts are conspicuously absent.  Again, a more robust, 
fact-based pleading requirement would serve to limit joinder in 
cases where joining separate and distinct defendants would 
normally be improper. 
Fourth, notice requirements must be improved to guarantee 
that putative defendants receive actual notice of proceedings 
 
whatismyipaddress.com/ip-lookup (last visited Sept. 18, 2011) (providing a tool 
designed to give additional information for specific IP addresses). 
 147. See, e.g., Donkeyball Movie, LLC v. Does 1–171, No. 10-1520 (BAH), 2011 
WL 1807452, at *4 (D.D.C. May 12, 2011) (holding that joinder “of unknown 
parties identified only by IP addresses is proper” under Rule 20(a)(2) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 148. See id. at *4–7 (finding joinder proper at the early stage of litigation, even 
where movant’s assertion of misjoinder may be meritorious).  
 149. Id. 
 150. See supra Part III.C. 
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concerning their privacy.  One possible way to ensure that those 
involved receive notice would be to create a formal requirement for 
OSPs to provide such notice to their subscribers.  Unfortunately, 
such a process would rely on uninvolved and disinterested third 
parties, which may not be enough to safeguard the rights of would-
be defendants.  However, because plaintiffs often lack the ability to 
contact defendants directly,151 such notice and identity escrow may 
be necessary if effective notice is to be given. 
Finally, whatever procedural standards are applied to 
unmasking anonymous defendants they should be applied equally 
to different causes of action.  Two anonymous defendants with 
equally strong or weak cases, one accused of copyright 
infringement and the other defamation, should have the same 
odds of success on procedural matters.  Neither copyright 
infringement nor defamation is protected speech, but if the 
plaintiff cannot succeed in proving its case, both defendants may 
be equally harmed by being identified.   
V. CONCLUSION 
None of the proposals from the foregoing section are novel; all 
of the suggested methods are currently being employed by various 
courts to resolve the very problems outlined in this article.152  The 
problem, then, is lack of unity.  Where one court requires detailed 
facts in order to assert jurisdiction in cases involving anonymous 
defendants,153 another allows the plaintiff to proceed with identity-
related discovery before addressing the question of jurisdictional 
propriety.154  Because the Internet spans the entire nation,155 the 
 
 151. By their very nature, anonymous defendants are unknown, and thus lack 
contact information. 
 152. See, e.g., Boy Racer, Inc. v. Does 1–22, No. 11 C 2984, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 49557, at *1–2 (N.D. Ill. May 9, 2011) (“Steele and his client [should] 
pursue the normal path of suing an identifiable (and identified) defendant or 
defendants rather than a passel of ‘Does.’. . . Boy Racer is free to advance its 
copyright infringement claims against one or more identified defendants on an 
individual basis or, if appropriate, a plausible conspiracy theory.”); CP 
Productions, Inc. v. Does 1–300, No. 10 C 6255, 2011 WL 737761 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 
2011) (upholding previous order “dismissing the action without prejudice against 
all 300 putative defendants” under Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure); Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760–61 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2001) (“[T]he plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence supporting 
each element of its cause of action, on a prima facie basis, prior to a court 
ordering the disclosure of the identity of the unnamed defendant.”).  
 153. Dendrite Int’l, Inc., 775 A.2d at 760–761. 
 154. See, e.g., Donkeyball Movie, LLC v. Does 1–171, No. 10-1520 (BAH), 2011 
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law applied to the particular case—and therefore, the amount of 
protection afforded to the defendant’s privacy—varies by the state 
in which the plaintiff files suit, thereby encouraging forum 
shopping.  Exacerbating this problem is the fact that many of the 
lawsuits brought against anonymous Internet defendants (e.g., file-
sharing and copyright infringement) have their cause of action 
established by federal law, giving the plaintiff some leeway to pick 
and choose among the courts to select one that is unsympathetic to 
the privacy concerns of anonymous Internet defendants.156 
In light of the nationwide nature of the Internet, any solution 
must be nationwide, as well.  Unfortunately, state sovereignty makes 
it difficult for different jurisdictions to reach a consensus, but as 
states recognize the abuses inflicted upon anonymous Internet 
defendants, they may come to adopt the solutions already found by 
others.  National agreement on measures designed to protect the 
identities of anonymous Internet users that still affords plaintiffs 
opportunities to unmask their opponents where genuine disputes 
exist would go a long way towards leveling the playing field. 
 
 
WL 1807452 (D.D.C. May 12, 2011). 
 155. See Barry M. Leiner et al., A Brief History of the Internet, INTERNET SOC’Y, 
http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml (last visited Sept. 1, 2011).   
 156. At the time of writing, courts in the District of Columbia have tended to 
fall in this category.  See, e.g., Donkeyball Movie, 2011 WL 1807452. 
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